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This study examines the influence of the social network 
of board interlocks on strategic alliance formation. Our 
theoretical framework suggests how board interlock ties 
to other firms can increase or decrease the likelihood of 
alliance formation, depending on the content of relation- 
ships between CEOs (chief executive officers) and out- 
side directors. Results suggest that CEO-board relation- 
ships characterized by independent board control reduce 
the likelihood of alliance formation by prompting distrust 
between corporate leaders, while CEO-board cooperation 
in strategic decision making appears to promote alliance 
formation by enhancing trust. The findings also show 
how the effects of direct interlock ties are amplified fur- 
ther by third-party network ties.* 
The board interlock network has been viewed as an ideal 
arena in which to develop and test the embeddedness per- 
spective on interorganizational relations. The board of direc- 
tors is a unique formal mechanism linking top managers of 
large corporations; it provides an opportunity for leaders to 
exchange information, observe the leadership practices and 
style of their peers, and witness firsthand the consequences 
of those practices. Thus, from this perspective, board ties to 
other firms should have a strong influence over corporate 
policy and strategy decisions. The empirical literature on 
board interlocks has extended research on the diffusion of 
innovations by specifying the social networks through which 
a variety of policies and practices are spread across firms 
(e.g., Mizruchi, 1992; Haunschild, 1993; Palmer, Jennings, 
and Zhou, 1993; Westphal and Zajac, 1997). 
While interlock research has advanced our understanding of 
the consequences of interlocks for firms, significant con- 
cerns have also been raised that reflect more general con- 
cerns about the application of network theory to interorgani- 
zational relations (Mizruchi, 1996). Several authors have 
expressed concern about the consistency and magnitude of 
network effects (Stinchcombe, 1990; Fligstein, 1995). Weak 
or inconsistent findings may result from two limitations com- 
mon to most prior studies. First, prior interlock research has 
not adequately specified the content of network ties (Hirsch, 
1982; Pettigrew, 1992; Mizruchi, 1996: 288). Content here 
implies a specification of the nature of the relationship and 
behavioral processes underlying a connection between two 
actors. Although recent research in the governance literature 
suggests that relationships between top managers on corpo- 
rate boards may be characterized by independence and dis- 
trust in some cases (Westphal, 1999), in the interlock litera- 
ture all ties are generally treated as equally positive 
connections that facilitate social cohesion and the exchange 
of information between firms. This ignores heterogeneity 
that may exist among interlocks in the extent to which they 
channel information and engender trusting relations between 
board members. 
Another concern with interlock research is its primary focus 
on the effect of direct ties or relational embeddedness on 
firm behavior to the exclusion of more distant network ties 
or structural embeddedness (Granovetter, 1992). While there 
is ample evidence in network research that both relational 
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and structural embeddedness can influence behavior (e.g., 
Burt, 1987; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999), this has had limited 
application in interlocks research. Studies in the larger net- 
work literature have shown that indirect network ties be- 
tween actors can strongly condition the effects of direct ties 
between them (Gulati, 1995b). Moreover, recent research 
also suggests that indirect network ties can amplify differ- 
ences in the magnitude of the effect of direct ties, such that 
distrust between actors is exacerbated in the presence of 
indirect ties between them (Burt and Knez, 1995). Thus, it 
may be possible to uncover stronger interlock effects by 
modeling variation in the content of direct ties and examin- 
ing how such ties are conditioned by the larger social struc- 
ture. 
The present study examines the influence of heterogeneous 
social processes that underlie interlock ties, and the moder- 
ating effects of indirect network ties, on the creation of stra- 
tegic alliances between firms. Some ties may promote the 
creation of a new alliance, while others could actually reduce 
its likelihood, depending on the behavioral content of the tie. 
As a result, there may be both bright and dark sides to em- 
beddedness in interorganizational relationships. Although re- 
cent studies have focused on how the network of prior alli- 
ances provides valuable information to potential partners 
about each other's reliability, capabilities, and needs (Kogut, 
Shan, and Walker, 1992; Gulati, 1995b; Powell, Koput, and 
Smith-Doerr, 1996), this literature has not considered the 
role of alternative networks such as board interlocks in guid- 
ing the formation of new alliances or in strategic cooperation 
between firms. In this paper, we examine the role of board 
interlocks, focusing on a subset of alliances known as joint 
ventures, which entail the creation of a separate legal entity 
in which the parent firms take equity, and use the term alli- 
ance to refer specifically to joint ventures. Such alliances 
typically entail a considerable outlay of resources and create 
enduring and irreversible commitments between partners, 
which can make the influence of the board interlock network 
on their formation even more important. Such a network can 
be an important source of information for top managers 
about the reliability and capabilities of potential venture part- 
ners. 
CONTENT OF INTERLOCK TIES AND EFFECTS 
ON ALLIANCES 
Empirical studies examining the consequences of interlock- 
ing directorates for the diffusion of innovations and the likeli- 
hood of strategic change have typically viewed interlock ties 
in broad terms as a mechanism for resolving uncertainty for 
top management decision makers (Galaskiewicz, 1985a). In 
discussing how interlock ties may facilitate the diffusion of 
an innovation, scholars have emphasized the value of direct 
communication between managers and directors in reducing 
ambiguity about the implications of adoption. From this per- 
spective, information from fellow corporate leaders is par- 
ticularly influential because it comes from a trusted source 
(Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993). Research on the conse- 
quences of interlocking directorates would also suggest that 
interlock ties could help resolve uncertainty for top manage- 
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ment decision makers about the implications of forming stra- 
tegic alliances with another firm. Moreover, the question 
here relates not only to the adoption of strategic alliances in 
general, but also to the choice of a specific partner. While 
prior research has typically described interlocks as conduits 
of information about administrative innovations, it is reason- 
able to expect that board members also communicate infor- 
mation about their respective parent organizations. The so- 
cial embeddedness created by interlock ties should help 
resolve uncertainty for top managers about the motives and 
management capabilities of other organizations as potential 
alliance partners. 
Despite their explosive growth, strategic alliances are associ- 
ated with a variety of risks and pitfalls that result in consider- 
able uncertainty about the decision to enter such ties. This 
uncertainty stems from two main sources (Gulati, 1995a, 
1995b). First, organizations have difficulty in obtaining infor- 
mation about the competencies and needs of potential part- 
ners. Such information is often confidential and may not be 
revealed outside a close relationship, but organizations must 
understand the needs and capabilities of potential partners if 
both organizations are to derive benefits from the alliance. 
The second source of uncertainty that affects strategic alli- 
ances stems from the paucity of information about the reli- 
ability of the potential partners, whose behavior is a key fac- 
tor in the success of an alliance. Organizations entering 
alliances face considerable moral hazard concerns because 
of the unpredictability of the behavior of partners and the 
likely costs to an organization from opportunistic behavior by 
a partner, if it occurs (Kogut, 1989; Doz, Hamel, and Pra- 
halad, 1989; Gulati, Khanna, and Nohria, 1994; Khanna, Gu- 
lati, and Nohria, 1998). A partner organization may either free 
ride by limiting its contributions to an alliance or may simply 
behave opportunistically, taking advantage of the close rela- 
tionship to use resources or information in ways that may 
damage the partner's interests. 
Recent research builds on Granovetter's notion of embed- 
dedness (1985) and suggests that organizations address the 
potential hazards associated with building alliances by relying 
on information provided through existing interorganizational 
networks (Gulati, 1998). While the focus of this research has 
been on the role of the network of prior alliances (e.g., Gulati 
and Gargiulo, 1999), board interlocks may also channel infor- 
mation between firms and thus serve as a catalyst for the 
creation of new alliances between firms. Beyond allowing 
top managers to form relationships with managers of pro- 
spective alliance partners, board ties may also enable direc- 
tors to acquire firsthand knowledge about another firm's ca- 
pabilities, activities, and plans through their communications 
with top management and their involvement in the decision- 
making process. Top managers can identify and pursue alli- 
ances by jointly discovering opportunities for collaboration in 
ongoing discussions. Networks can also provide information 
in a timely manner, which can be important when a firm 
seeking attractive alliance partners must approach them at 
the right juncture and preempt their seeking alliances else- 
where. This suggests an initial, baseline hypothesis on the 
effect of interlock ties on alliance formation: 
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Hypothesis 1: An interlock tie between two firms will increase the 
likelihood of subsequent alliance formation between them. 
The discussion thus far has assumed that interlock ties indi- 
cate positive social contact between top managers and out- 
side directors of the focal firm. A similar rationale has been 
used in much prior research on board interlocks and the dif- 
fusion of organizational innovations. As interlock researchers 
have generally recognized, however, there is considerable 
variation in the nature of management-board relationships, 
though the consequences of this heterogeneity have yet to 
be systematically examined (Herman, 1981; Johnson, 
Hoskisson, and Hitt, 1993; Mizruchi, 1996). The form of 
management-board relationships can range from a positive 
and relatively cohesive relationship between top managers 
and outside directors to a negative and independent one, 
with very different consequences for the likelihood of ven- 
ture formation. 
Independent Board Control and Alliances 
According to agency perspectives, while top managers are 
responsible for ongoing decision management, the board of 
directors is responsible for decision control, which involves 
monitoring and evaluating management decision making and 
performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In effect, the board 
is viewed as an efficient control device that can help align 
management decision making with shareholders' interests 
(Beatty and Zajac, 1994). For instance, to the extent that 
managers' personal preferences regarding executive com- 
pensation, corporate diversification, or other strategy and 
policy issues conflict with the interests of shareholders, 
boards can intervene to ensure that shareholders' interests 
are protected (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Hill and Snell, 
1988). Moreover, from this perspective, outside directors in 
particular are critical to the board's ability to exercise control, 
because as non-employee directors they are formally inde- 
pendent from management and thus better able to evaluate 
management decisions and actions objectively on behalf of 
shareholders' interests. 
In prior years, this agency model of the relationship between 
the chief executive officer (CEO) and the board could be dis- 
missed as an anomaly. Organization theorists have typically 
suggested that while outside directors are in a position to 
exercise independent control over management, various be- 
havioral factors effectively limit the social independence of 
outsiders, impairing their ability or willingness to exert con- 
trol. For instance, given evidence that CEOs traditionally dic- 
tate the selection of new directors, several authors have 
suggested that CEOs can appoint personal friends or other 
individuals with whom they have preexisting social ties (e.g., 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988; Wade, O'Reilly, and Chan- 
dratat, 1990; Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993). Such ties are 
thought to inhibit the board's willingness to contradict man- 
agement's preferences on behalf of shareholders. Moreover, 
organization theorists have long maintained that generalized 
norms of support among managerial elites enforce a passive 
role for outside directors in strategic decision making (e.g., 
Herman, 1981; Whisler, 1984). From this perspective, boards 
have little potential to serve as independent agents of con- 
476/AS Q. S epte mber 1 999 
 at University of Texas Libraries on March 6, 2015asq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Cooperative or Controlling? 
trol and, supporting the assumption of interlock theorists, 
management-board ties are characterized by social cohesion. 
The recent literature on boards of directors, however, has 
provided some evidence that widespread norms about the 
role of corporate boards may be changing. Useem (1993) 
and Westphal and Zajac (1997) have documented the spread 
of changes in board structure, composition, and executive 
compensation that appear to indicate increased board control 
over management among large corporations over the past 
fifteen years. This trend may have originated in response to 
external criticism from institutional investors and other stake- 
holders and the threat of lawsuits over perceived negligence 
in protecting shareholders' interests (Kesner and Johnson, 
1990; Davis and Thompson, 1994). External constituents 
have demanded evidence that boards are willing to challenge 
management's decisions on their behalf. For instance, 
boards have been told to expand the search for new direc- 
tors beyond the CEO's close circle of personal friends and to 
alter board structure and processes in ways that diminish 
the CEO's direct control over board meetings (Kaplan and 
Harrison, 1993; Daily, 1996). In effect, boards have been 
pressured to adopt a role characterized by more independent 
monitoring and control over management. Nevertheless, 
while there has been a general move toward more assertive 
boards that assert greater control over CEOs, there remains 
considerable variance across boards in the extent to which 
they have adopted a controlling orientation. 
The consequences for alliance formation. There are sev- 
eral possible consequences of independent board control on 
the prospects of alliance formation between the focal firm 
and manager-directors' home companies. On one level, a 
CEO-board relationship characterized by monitoring and con- 
trol simply entails lower cohesion between the CEO and the 
board, or the absence of a strong tie, but it may go further 
than that. Independent board control over management may 
actually produce a negative relationship between the CEO 
and the board characterized by a lack of mutual understand- 
ing and distrust. When benevolence and support toward the 
CEO is replaced with independent control over the CEO, 
leaders of the firm can become effectively divided into sepa- 
rate groups: decision managers (i.e., the CEO and other top 
managers) and decision controllers (i.e., outside directors) 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983), where they were previously com- 
mon members of a mutually supportive, inner circle of elites 
(Useem, 1982). The literature on intergroup relations has pro- 
vided consistent evidence, in both laboratory and field set- 
tings, that dividing a single group of individuals into two or 
more separate groups has a variety of negative effects on 
relations between members of the different groups (Miller 
and Brewer, 1996). Empirical studies have demonstrated 
that when individuals are divided into separate groups, atti- 
tudes about the out-group members become significantly 
more negative (Gaertner et al., 1989; Messick and Mackie, 
1989). In particular, group categorization has been shown to 
foster distrust toward out-group members while also creat- 
ing the perception of intergroup conflict (Kramer, 1996; 
Miller and Brewer, 1996; Labianca, Brass, and Gray, 1998). 
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Out-group categorization, which in the case of interlocks oc- 
curs when CEOs view outside directors as controllers rather 
than supporters or fellow managers, can promote distrust 
both with respect to the capabilities of the other party (task- 
based trust) and the risk that they might limit their contribu- 
tions to the relationship (relational trust) (Creed and Miles, 
1996), thus prompting negative evaluations of the perceived 
capability and personal reliability of the other party. This out- 
group bias occurs even when the basis for group categoriza- 
tion is arbitrary or minimal (Brewer, 1979). Moreover, Kramer 
(1994, 1996: 224) and others (Fenigstein and Vanable, 1992) 
have found evidence that when individuals are subjected to 
"evaluative scrutiny" or control by out-group members, "a 
pattern of exaggerated mistrust" may develop. 
Applying research on intergroup relations to the CEO-board 
context, we expect that when outside directors assert them- 
selves as an independent group of controllers accountable to 
shareholders rather than management, distrust can arise be- 
tween top managers and outside directors. Whereas outside 
directors on passive and supportive boards are effectively 
insiders with regard to their orientation toward management, 
on controlling boards such directors adopt the perspective of 
an independent outsider. As a result, the perception of a di- 
vision between insiders and outsiders can reinforce "a gen- 
eralized sense of distrust" across groups and lead to "esca- 
lating cycles of distrust" when out-group members are 
exercising control (Sitkin and Stickel, 1996: 199). A behav- 
ioral manifestation of distrust is "reduced cooperative efforts 
of all kinds" and enhanced competition for resources and 
status between groups (Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Gaertner 
et al., 1989; Creed and Miles, 1996: 27). Thus, intergroup 
bias would lead each party of the management-board rela- 
tionship to view members of the other group as less trust- 
worthy in both professional and personal terms, reducing 
interest in various forms of cooperation. 
The literature on strategic alliances suggests that trust plays 
a critical role as an enabling condition of alliance formation 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Gulati, 1995a, 1995b; Dyer, 
1996; Gulati and Singh, 1998). Trust fundamentally entails a 
willingness to put oneself at risk (Barney and Hansen, 1994; 
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995), and several authors 
have emphasized the potential for opportunistic behavior to 
derail joint ventures (e.g., Doz, Hamel, and Prahalad, 1989; 
Gulati, Khanna, and Nohria, 1994). In the presence of trust, 
managers will be less concerned about the incentive of a 
partner to cheat or free ride in cooperative relations by limit- 
ing its contribution to the joint enterprise. Since intergroup 
bias resulting from independent board control can diminish 
both task-based trust and relational trust, one might expect 
that when directors have asserted themselves as an inde- 
pendent group responsible for controlling managers rather 
than supporting them, CEOs may view them as less trust- 
worthy alliance partners. Board independence can also pre- 
vent top managers and manager-directors from becoming 
familiar with each other's management and decision-making 
styles and developing a professional rapport, and managers 
tend to believe that teamwork and rapport between them is 
a critical factor in the success of alliances (Alster, 1986; 
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Borys and Jemison, 1989). Moreover, given that distrust to- 
ward an independent, controlling group is a basic and power- 
ful human response (Kramer, 1994, 1996; Fenigstein and 
Vanable, 1992), independent board control may have a par- 
ticularly strong, negative effect on alliance formation be- 
tween top managers and manager-directors: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the board's control over the CEO, the 
lower the likelihood of subsequent alliance formation between the 
focal firm and outside directors' home companies. 
CEO-board Cooperation and Alliances 
While empirical research on boards has typically assumed 
that board involvement in corporate affairs entails indepen- 
dent monitoring and control by outside directors (Johnson, 
Hoskisson, and Hitt, 1993), the larger literature on boards 
has suggested another form of involvement. In his classic 
qualitative study, Mace (1971: 179) concluded that, while 
boards often did not challenge management's final deci- 
sions, they may nevertheless provide "advice and counsel" 
to management on strategic issues during the decision-mak- 
ing process. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 170) also distin- 
guished the provision of advice and counsel from board con- 
trol as two different forms of board administration (see also 
Mintzberg, 1983). In a recent large-sample empirical study, 
Westphal (1999) found support for this general classification. 
Factor analysis showed that CEO-board relationships could 
be classified into three categories: independent monitoring 
and control, close cooperation (i.e., advice and counsel), or 
inaction. Moreover, qualitative and survey evidence suggests 
that advice and counsel is typically provided at the CEO's 
request (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Demb and Neubauer, 
1992). Thus, rather than remain independent of top manag- 
ers to permit objective monitoring and evaluation of manage- 
rial decision making, some boards enter closer working rela- 
tionships with CEOs by providing advice and counsel at the 
CEO's request. In such cases, CEOs direct a cooperative 
form of board involvement in which boards work together 
with them to govern the firm, rather than separately in a 
principal-agent relationship. 
The consequences for alliance formation. Cooperative 
CEO-board relationships may influence alliance formation be- 
tween the focal firm and manager-directors' home compa- 
nies in several ways. On one level, CEO-board cooperation 
should enhance trust between top managers and outside 
directors through social interaction alone. Simmel's (1964) 
theory of trust emphasized how the mere occurrence of so- 
cial interaction builds trust or the expectation of faithfulness, 
and other theorists have suggested that more frequent inter- 
action increases trust by enhancing mutual affect and famil- 
iarity (Laumann, Galaskiewicz, and Marsden, 1978; Gulati, 
1995a; Creed and Miles, 1996). Accordingly, the heightened 
social interaction that results when there is greater CEO- 
board cooperation (i.e., advice seeking) should reinforce rela- 
tional trust between CEOs and outside directors. 
The connection between cooperative interactions in CEO- 
board relationships and the extent of trust between manag- 
ers can also be understood by considering some of the evi- 
dence from research on intergroup relations. According to 
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this literature, cooperative interactions between group mem- 
bers make common goals more salient, which builds mutual 
trust and respect (Gaertner et al., 1990, 1999). Thus, while 
independent board control may reduce trust by effectively 
dividing top managers and outside directors into separate 
groups, the CEO's seeking advice from the board should en- 
hance trust by drawing outside directors into a collective de- 
cision-making team. In effect, just as negative affect and dis- 
trust toward an independent, controlling group is a basic and 
powerful human response, cooperation between group 
members can engender in-group biases that lead to positive 
affect and higher, even excessive levels of trust between 
individuals (Fenigstein, 1979; Kramer, 1996). Given the im- 
portance of intermanagement trust in facilitating alliance for- 
mation, cooperative CEO-board relationships should promote 
alliances between a focal firm and those of outside directors 
by enhancing confidence in each other's reliability and mana- 
gerial capability and lowering the perceived risk of opportun- 
ism: 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the cooperation between the CEO and 
the board, the higher the likelihood of subsequent alliance forma- 
tion between the focal firm and outside directors' home companies. 
The Role of Indirect Ties 
While little empirical research has examined how social 
structural factors such as indirect ties moderate the effects 
of dyadic interlock ties between firms, qualitative evidence 
suggests that managers may have access to indirect infor- 
mation about directors through their appointments on other 
boards (Useem, 1984; O'Neal and Thomas, 1993). An indi- 
rect or third-party tie could provide top managers with an 
important source of information about outside directors who 
sit on their board. For example, a top manager A is exposed 
to second-hand information about outside director B on his 
or her board when A has a common appointment on another 
board with a third director C, who sits on B's board. These 
indirect ties are particularly relevant to the present study, in 
light of recent evidence suggesting that third-party ties can 
affect the level of trust between individuals or organizations 
(e.g., Raub and Weesie, 1990; Burt and Knez, 1995; Gulati, 
1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). 
It is typically supposed that third-party ties will enhance trust 
between parties to a relationship by increasing the reputa- 
tional costs of noncooperative behavior (Van de Ven, 1976). 
For instance, if A is cheated by relationship partner B, and A 
has third-party ties to B through C, A can impose reputa- 
tional costs on B by spreading the word to C that B cannot 
be trusted. Given this threat, A can trust B not to defect 
from cooperative exchange (Kreps, 1990). The claim that 
third-party ties enforce cooperation through reputational ef- 
fects assumes that noncooperative behavior is illegitimate or 
non-normative, like cheating a friend (Granovetter, 1992). In 
many cases, however, noncooperative behavior involving 
competition or control is not normatively proscribed in the 
larger social structure, or the related norms are ambiguous. 
As several authors have noted, norms governing CEO-board 
relationships have become uncertain: it is not clear whether 
independent board control is more or less normative or legiti- 
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mate than CEO-board cooperation (Lorsch and Maciver, 
1989; Useem, 1993). Accordingly, noncooperative behavior, 
such as exercising independent control, does not necessarily 
have negative reputational consequences for the partici- 
pants; it does not necessarily damage a director's career, as 
empirical research on director selection has shown (Zajac 
and Westphal, 1996). Thus, third-party ties between a CEO 
and his or her board members may not necessarily reduce 
the likelihood of noncooperative behavior in CEO-board rela- 
tionships. 
While traditional perspectives on indirect network ties may 
not apply to board interlocks, recent research on the effects 
of third-party ties suggests a more germane perspective. 
Burt and Knez (1995, 1996) have extended existing theories 
on how social structure affects trust by proposing that third- 
party ties amplify existing trust or distrust in professional re- 
lationships (see also Labianca, Brass, and Gray, 1998). They 
showed empirically that when the immediate relationship 
between managers tended to foster trust between them, 
third-party ties further enhanced trust in the relationship. At 
the same time, third-party ties amplified any distrust that al- 
ready existed in the relationship. They concluded that third- 
party ties influence the intensity but not the direction of trust 
in managerial relationships; that is, indirect ties make manag- 
ers more certain of their trust (or distrust) in another. In de- 
veloping their theory, Burt and Knez suggested that manag- 
ers exchange information or gossip with third-party ties 
about other managers, and the social dynamics underlying 
such interactions lead third parties to reaffirm whichever pre- 
disposition managers have' toward their colleagues. This is 
consistent with anthropological and social psychological re- 
search on network gossip, which suggests that people gos- 
sip with third parties in a search for affirmation of their feel- 
ings and beliefs about other individuals in their network; in 
the process, gossip also serves to reaffirm the values that 
underlie those beliefs (Cox, 1970; Haviland, 1977; Besnier, 
1989). Moreover, by validating ego's trust or distrust in alter, 
a third party strengthens his or her relationship with ego 
(Byrne, Clore, and Worchel, 1966). Such behavior can be mo- 
tivated by political self-interest or simply by the desire to 
maintain social cohesion for its own sake (Cox, 1970; Burt 
and Knez, 1995). 
We can extend our previous hypothesis by considering the 
possibility that third-party ties between a CEO and his or her 
board members resulting from appointments on other 
boards may amplify the effects of these different relation- 
ships on trust between CEOs and outside directors. As 
noted above, qualitative research on boards suggests that 
the relationship between top manager A and outside director 
B is influenced by third-party ties when A has a common 
appointment to another board with a third director, C, who 
sits on B's board. From the third-party gossip perspective, 
when A and C discuss B (or A's relationship with B), the so- 
cial dynamics underlying such interactions will lead C to con- 
firm A's predisposition by drawing on his or her prior experi- 
ence with B. For example, if A expresses doubt to C about 
whether B can be trusted to support A's decisions, C will 
tend to affirm A's distrust, either by providing explicit infor- 
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mation or "replicating accounts" of B's behavior or through 
more subtle affirmations (e.g., "that doesn't surprise me") or 
nonverbal signals (Cox, 1970; Burt and Knez, 1995: 260). 
Such interactions are especially likely in that top managers 
have become increasingly concerned in recent years about 
whether they can count on the loyalty and support of their 
outside directors (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). This suggests 
additional hypotheses, predicting that indirect ties between 
CEOs and outside directors through third-party directors in 
the interlock network will tend to amplify the relationship 
between each kind of CEO-board tie and the likelihood of 
alliance formation: 
Hypothesis 4: Indirect interlock ties between the CEO and outside 
directors through third-party directors will interact with the content 
of the focal CEO-board tie to predict alliance formation between the 
focal firm and outside directors' home companies. 
Hypothesis 4a: The more indirect interlock ties there are between 
the CEO and outside directors through third-party directors, the 
stronger the negative relationship between board control over the 
CEO and the likelihood of subsequent alliance formation between 
the focal firm and outside directors' home companies. 
Hypothesis 4b: The more indirect interlock ties there are between 
the CEO and outside directors through third-party directors, the 
stronger the positive relationship between CEO-board cooperation 
and the likelihood of subsequent alliance formation between the 
focal firm and outside directors' home companies. 
METHOD 
Sample and Data Collection 
The sample frame for this study included 600 firms selected 
from the Fortune and Forbes 500 indexes of U.S. industrial 
and service firms. We collected both archival and survey- 
based information on these firms. Archival information was 
collected on alliances formed, board interlocks and other 
board characteristics, strategic variables, and financial data. 
To measure board control and CEO-board cooperation, a 
questionnaire survey was distributed in April 1995 to all 
CEOs of the 600 firms. In addition, to assess interrater reli- 
ability, another questionnaire was sent to individuals serving 
as outside directors at one or more companies whose CEO 
responded (N = 1,312 directors). 
Surveys of top managers have been plagued by low re- 
sponse rates. To ensure the highest possible response in 
this case, the following steps were taken (Forsythe, 1977; 
Fowler, 1993; Groves, Cialdini, and Couper, 1992): First, an 
in-depth pre-test was used to refine the format and length of 
the survey. Second, the cover letter linked the present study 
with prior surveys on top management issues conducted by 
a major business school, while noting that hundreds of their 
peers had responded to the prior surveys; the letter also 
highlighted the need for research on CEO-board relations, 
which also engages respondents' natural interest in the topic 
(see Groves, Cialdini, and Couper, 1992). Third, nonrespon- 
dents were sent a second letter with a new questionnaire 
about 21 days after the initial mailing. As a result of these 
efforts, 263 of the 600 CEOs in the sample frame re- 
sponded, a response rate of 44 percent. Moreover, 564 of 
the 1,312 outside directors responded, yielding a response 
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rate of 43 percent. These response rates are high compared 
with other top management surveys (Pettigrew, 1992). 
To check for nonresponse bias, respondents and nonrespon- 
dents were compared across a variety of firm characteristics 
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test (Siegel and 
Castellan, 1988). This assesses whether significant differ- 
ences exist between the distribution of respondents and 
nonrespondents for a given variable. As shown in table 1, 
the results of this test consistently suggest that respondents 
and nonrespondents come from the same population. We 
also assessed nonresponse bias according to the presence 
or absence of specific board structures and practices 
thought to indicate board control (cf. Hoskisson, Johnson, 
and Moesel, 1994; Belliveau, O'Reilly, and Wade, 1996). 
These analyses provided further evidence that nonresponse 
bias is not present in our data. In particular, a series of differ- 
ence in proportions tests showed that respondents and non- 
respondents were not significantly different with respect to 
the existence of (1) an executive committee on the board (D 
= .018; p = .260); (2) a nominating committee composed of 
outsiders (D = .011; p = .585); or (3) a management develop- 
ment and compensation committee (D = .009; p = .649). 
Moreover, respondents were not significantly different in 
their use (vs. non-use) of stock compensation for directors 
(D = .019; p = .212), and CEOs of responding firms were 
neither more nor less likely to serve as an ex-officio non- 
voting director on the board (D = .016; p = .435). 
We collected data on all alliances initiated by firms in the 
sample frame from 1970 to 1996. This sample includes all 
interfirm partnerships that entail the creation of a new legal 
entity in which both partners hold equity, also referred to as 
joint ventures. We coded these data manually from the Funk 
and Scott Predicasts Index of Corporate Change and from 
Lexis/Nexis. We recorded only joint ventures that had actu- 
ally been formed and excluded reports of probable joint ven- 
tures that never materialized. We made an effort to ensure 
Table 1 
Results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov Difference Test for Nonresponse Bias* 
Largest positive Largest negative 
Variablest difference difference p-value 
Size .073 -.037 .499 
Performance .037 -.069 .510 
Solvency .067 -.023 .544 
Liquidity .030 -.100 .149 
Outsider ratio .048 -.035 .911 
Joint tenure .052 -.013 .882 
Constraint .058 -.029 .763 
Number of interlock ties .002 -.059 .754 
Prior alliance activity .041 -.091 .216 
Institutional ownership .025 -.082 .361 
* N = 218 respondents and 274 nonrespondents. Differences indicate the 
largest positive/negative deviations observed when the cumulative fre- 
quency distribution (i.e., step function) for nonrespondents is subtracted 
from that of respondents. 
t This test could not be applied to board leadership structure, but respondents 
and nonrespondents did not differ significantly on the portion of firms with 
separate CEO and board chair positions (.29 versus .27). 
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that these data were comprehensive in covering all alliances 
during the time period. We predict alliance formation over 
the two-year period following the survey date (1995-1996), 
and we used the remaining historical alliance data to com- 
pute some key control variables described below. We col- 
lected data on board interlocks and board structure for the 
period 1994-1995 from Standard and Poor's Register of Cor- 
porations, Directors, and Executives and the Dun and Brad- 
street Reference Book of Corporate Management. To calcu- 
late measures of market constraint (discussed below), we 
obtained input-output data from the database created by the 
Interindustry Economics Division of the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (cf. Burt, 1992; Mizruchi, 1992). Data on financial 
characteristics and other firm attributes were obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. 
Measures 
Alliance formation was measured with a dichotomous vari- 
able, coded 1 if the two firms in a dyad entered into an alli- 
ance during the two-year period following the survey date 
(i.e., 1995-1996). We also conducted two separate analyses 
with alliance formation measured for different time periods. 
In one analysis we measured alliance formation over one 
year (1996), and in the second analysis, we observed alli- 
ances formed over the period 1993-1994, using retrospec- 
tive measures of board control and CEO-board cooperation in 
1992. For each of these separate analyses, results for the 
hypothesized relationships were very similar to the results 
presented below, suggesting that our findings are robust for 
different time periods. 
We measured board interlocks as directional ties, which are 
created by individuals who are principally affiliated as officers 
or owners with the firms they connect (Davis, 1991; Haun- 
schild, 1993; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993). Thus, two 
firms, A and B, are coded as having an interlock tie when at 
least one officer or owner from firm A serves as an outside 
director at firm B, or vice versa. 
A pre-test involving in-depth pilot interviews with 22 top 
managers and board members was used to refine and re- 
word the survey items (cf. Fowler, 1993: 102). Board control 
and CEO-board cooperation were measured with two multi- 
item scales from the CEO survey that were carefully vali- 
dated with responses from the outside director survey and 
also with archival measures of board characteristics. Items in 
the control scale assessed key behavioral elements of board 
control that have been theorized to entail board indepen- 
dence from management, including the board's tendency to 
monitor and evaluate CEO decision making and performance 
and the frequency with which directors challenge the CEO's 
position on strategic issues, rather than deferring to the 
CEO's judgment. Items in the cooperation scale were based 
on prior qualitative research about how CEOs may engage in 
ongoing collaboration with outside directors by seeking their 
advice and counsel on strategic issues, as discussed above. 
We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL. 
The chi square for the measurement model comprising the 
control and cooperation constructs was not significant (p 
value = .48), suggesting that the model provides an ad- 
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This method differs from the ordinary re- 
gression method for estimating factors 
by minimizing the sum of squares of the 
unique factors over the range of items, 
rather than minimizing the discrepancies 
between the true and estimated factors. 
The Bartlett method produces less biased 
estimates than the regression method for 
moderate to large samples, although it 
may also produce less accurate esti- 
mates (Harman, 1976). In this case, how- 
ever, separate analyses confirmed that 
the results were identical when factors 
were estimated using the regression 
method rather than the Bartlett method. 
2 
These measures effectively assume that 
boards engage in control or cooperation 
as a group (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Al- 
derfer, 1986), so that the effects on the 
CEO's relationship with each director 
should be similar across directors, leading 
to similar effects on the likelihood of alli- 
ance formation between the focal firm 
and each of the outside directors' home 
companies. While this assumption is con- 
sistent with the prior literature on CEO- 
board relationships, in separate models 
we measured the individual participation 
of directors in control and cooperation 
activities with responses to separate 
questions in the director survey. These 
additional results are discussed further 
below. 
Cooperative or Controlling? 
equate fit to the data (Bollen, 1989). Thus, we proceeded to 
estimate cooperation and control factors using the Bartlett 
method.1 Interitem reliability was acceptable for both scales, 
with alphas of .89 for the cooperation items and .88 for the 
control items (Nunnally, 1978).2 
We also assessed interrater reliability by comparing CEOs' 
and outside directors' responses on the board control and 
cooperation items. We used the kappa correlation coeffi- 
cient, which corrects for the level of correlation that would 
be expected by chance. The results of this analysis and a 
brief description of the questions used for each construct 
are provided in table 2. Values exceeding .75 are typically 
thought to indicate excellent agreement, and values be- 
tween .40 and .75 indicate fair to good agreement (Landis 
and Koch, 1977; Fleiss, 1981). Kappas exceeded .75 for all 
items but one, and the overall value was .82. The sample for 
this analysis included companies with a responding CEO and 
at least one responding outside director (N = 188). As dis- 
cussed further below, we ran separate analyses in which 
control and cooperation were measured with directors' re- 
sponses rather than CEOs' responses. 
We also conducted tests of convergent validity for our mea- 
sures of board cooperation and control. First, we developed 
archival measures of each construct. The archival measure 
for control includes multiple aspects of board structure and 
practice that are thought to facilitate controlling behavior by 
boards: the use of stock to compensate directors, institu- 
tional ownership, and the presence or absence of the spe- 
cific committees listed above (Hoskisson, Johnson, and 
Moesel, 1994; Belliveau, O'Reilly, and Wade, 1996; David, 
Kochhar, and Levitas, 1998). Institutional ownership was 
measured as the percentage of total common stock held by 
pension funds, banks and trust companies, savings and 
loans, mutual fund managers, and labor union funds (Hansen 
and Hill, 1991). The dichotomous measures were combined 
into a Guttman scale and then combined with institutional 
ownership using principal components (Jackson, 1991). 
The archival measure of cooperation is a composite of three 
variables: joint tenure of the CEO and directors, complemen- 
tary functional backgrounds of the CEO and directors, and 
CEO stock ownership. The organizational demography litera- 
ture has provided consistent evidence that higher joint ten- 
ure increases the level of task-related communication and 
problem-solving behavior among group members (Zenger 
and Lawrence, 1989; O'Reilly, Snyder, and Boothe, 1993; 
Smith et al., 1994; Williams and O'Reilly, 1997). Moreover, 
the upper echelon perspective would suggest that directors 
are more valuable to CEOs as a source of strategic advice 
and counsel if they have a complementary base of functional 
expertise and experience (e.g., if the CEO has a financial 
background and directors have marketing backgrounds) 
(Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 1996). Functional background 
was measured using Hambrick and Mason's (1984) classifi- 
cation, calculated as the percentage of directors who had 
functional backgrounds complementary to the CEO. Finally, 
given that stock ownership aligns CEOs' interests with 
shareholders' interests, it may motivate CEOs to engage the 
cooperation of board members in the strategic decision-mak- 
485/ASQ, September 1999 
 at University of Texas Libraries on March 6, 2015asq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Table 2 
Results of Interrater Reliability Assessment (N= 188)* 
Agreement (%) 
Itemst Observed Expected Kappa1 
Board control 
1. To what extent does the board monitor top management 86.50 24.86 .82 
strategic decision making? 
2. To what extent does the board formally evaluate your 85.65 21.16 .82 
performance? 
3. To what extent does the board defer to your judgment on final 87.76 25.82 .84 
strategic decisions? 
4. Over the last twelve months in how many board meetings 88.19 27.40 .84 
have one or more directors challenged your position on a 
strategic issue? 
CEO-board cooperation 
1. To what extent do you solicit board assistance in the 79.32 24.00 .73 
formulation of corporate strategy? 
2. To what extent do you use outside directors as a "sounding 87.34 23.43 .83 
board" on strategic issues? 
3. How often have you sought the advice and counsel of outside 86.50 24.93 .82 
directors in discussions outside of board/committee meetings 
(by telephone or in person)? 
Overall kappa .82 
* N = 188. When multiple outside directors responded for the same company, directors' responses were averaged to 
ensure that reliability estimates were not inflated by common perspectives derived from holding the same position. 
t The phrasing of each item is taken from the CEO survey; most items were altered appropriately for the director survey 
(e.g., "To what extent does the CEO . . ."). For purposes of comparison across items, kappas were calculated for 
continuous-scale items by converting them into categorical variables (i.e., divided into quartiles). 
1 Z-statistics for all kappas are highly significant. 
ing process (Murphy, 1986; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
These three variables were combined into a composite mea- 
sure using principal components. 
The archival measure of control was significantly correlated 
with the survey measure of control (r = .42), while the archi- 
val measure of cooperation was significantly correlated with 
the survey measure of cooperation (r = .34). Moreover, the 
survey measure of cooperation was not significantly corre- 
lated with the archival measure of control, while the survey 
measure of control was not associated with the archival 
measure of cooperation. This analysis provides further evi- 
dence for the construct validity of the survey measures. 
We also examined the correlation between our archival mea- 
sures of board cooperation and control and a survey mea- 
sure of trust in the CEO-board relationship. This measure is 
a multi-item scale included in both the CEO and director sur- 
veys; specific items in the CEO scale assess, for instance, 
the degree to which the CEO feels that he or she can trust 
the board and the extent to which his or her relationship 
with outside directors is characterized by distrust. This mea- 
sure showed high interitem reliability (alpha = .91), as well 
as high interrater reliability (kappa = .85). Moreover, the trust 
measure is positively associated with the measure of coop- 
eration (r = .47) and negatively correlated with the measure 
of board control (r = -.41). This further supports the conver- 
gent validity of the survey measures. 
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Indirect ties between CEOs and outside directors through 
third-party directors (third-party ties) were measured for each 
dyad as the number of board appointments shared by the 
CEO and board members of the outside director's home 
company board, excluding the focal board. We tested the 
hypothesized interaction effects between third-party ties and 
the focal CEO-board ties using the product-term approach 
(Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990). 
Control variables. To ensure the robustness of our results, 
we included a number of control variables considered to in- 
fluence the formation of ventures between firms. Resource 
dependence perspectives suggest that firms may use coop- 
erative strategies to manage their dependence on other 
firms (for a review, see Oliver, 1990). According to this view, 
firms that are particularly dependent on each other may 
choose to form an alliance to secure future access to 
needed resource flows. To capture the role of resource con- 
siderations in promoting joint ventures, we built on Burt's 
(1983, 1992) measure of market constraint to capture the 
degree of resource interdependence between firms. Data on 
market constraint are available only at the industry level and 
have typically been used to compute aggregate constraint 
scores for firms. Burt (1983) defined constraint as the pro- 
portion of industry A's total transactions that involve B, mul- 
tiplied by the four-firm concentration of B. This measure indi- 
cates the extent to which firms in industry A are dependent 
on resources provided by firms in industry B. Burt's firm- 
level measure of constraint was based on the dependence 
of the firm's primary industry (i.e., the firm's primary two- 
digit SIC code). Galaskiewicz (1 985b) modified this measure 
by calculating the median constraint score across all indus- 
tries in which the two firms participated. Palmer, Friedland, 
and Singh's (1986) measure involved summing the number 
of significant constraint relations between industries in 
which the firms participated. We followed Mizruchi (1992) in 
reducing these three operationalizations to a single variable 
using principal components analysis. Mutual interdepen- 
dence between firms in a dyad is then measured as the total 
amount of constraint between them. This measure is high- 
est when both firms are in highly concentrated industries 
with a heavy flow of transactions between them. 
Since constraint is measured at the industry level, we also 
controlled for industry overlap, measured as the percentage 
of total sales between the two firms that are made to the 
same industry, to assess strategic complementarity at the 
firm level (Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996). This dyad- 
level measure allows us to assess the extent to which every 
specific pair of firms overlaps in the industries in which they 
operate. This measure has some limitations in that it treats 
all industries as equivalent and does not take into account the 
characteristics of the industries in which the overlap occurs. 
We included a number of measures that prior research 
would suggest may be important strategic and economic 
drivers for the creation of new ventures: (1) size, measured 
as the log of total sales; (2) performance, measured as a 
composite of return on assets and market-to-book value, 
which were combined using principal components analysis; 
(3) solvency, measured as the total amount of long-term 
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In our primary analyses, we measured 
these variables at the focal firm level, but 
these variables might also be specified at 
the dyad level; several authors have sug- 
gested that alliances form between firms 
with complementary needs and capabili- 
ties (e.g., Aiken and Hage, 1968; Richard- 
son, 1972; Paulson, 1976; Burgers, Hill, 
and Kim, 1993). Thus, for instance, poorly 
performing firms may seek alliances to 
gain access to capabilities of high-per- 
forming firms, while the latter seek to 
leverage those capabilities. Similarly, 
small firms may enter into alliances with 
large firms to gain access to economies 
of scale and scope, while large firms 
seek to spread the risks associated with 
new ventures. To measure each attribute 
at the dyad level, we divided the smaller 
value by the larger value. Larger values of 
this measure indicate greater similarity on 
the given attribute. In separate analyses, 
we included these dyad-level measures 
with the firm-level measures, but the re- 
sults were not substantively different 
from those presented below. We also 
conducted analyses in which separate 
variables were included for each firm in 
the dyad, and again, the results were 
substantively unchanged. Finally, the re- 
sults were robust to inclusion of addi- 
tional measures of diversification, includ- 
ing the percentage of sales made to 
global markets. 
4 
The effects of prior alliance activity were 
weaker when this variable was measured 
only for the focal firm or at the dyad 
level. This was not true for the economic/ 
strategy variables, as noted above, per- 
haps because alliance activity of one firm 
in the dyad was not correlated with activ- 
ity of the other firm, while the strategy 
variables were significantly correlated be- 
tween firms in the dyad, such that adding 
a separate economic/strategy variable for 
each firm in the dyad had little effect on 
the results. 
debt divided by current assets; (4) research and develop- 
ment (R&D) intensity, measured as research and develop- 
ment expense divided by total sales of the focal firm; (5) ad- 
vertising intensity, measured as advertising expense divided 
by total sales of the focal firm; and (6) diversification, mea- 
sured with the entropy variable, which takes into account 
the number of segments in which a firm operates and 
weights each segment according to its contribution to total 
sales (Palepu, 1985). Each variable was measured in the 
prior year.3 
We also controlled for the firms' prior alliance history. Firms 
may acquire unique information about other firms through 
their prior alliances with them, while developing routines that 
are specifically adapted to cooperation with those firms. 
Such investments may increase the likelihood that firms will 
continue to ally with the same firms over time (Gulati, 
1995a, 1995b; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Thus, 
we controlled for the number of prior alliance ties between 
firms in the dyad (prior alliance ties). To control for the his- 
torical propensity of each firm to initiate alliances, we also 
included variables indicating the total number of prior alli- 
ances initiated by each firm in the dyad (prior alliance activ- 
ity) (Gulati, 1999).4 To compute this measure as accurately 
as possible, we observed alliance activity from 1980 to 1994, 
since alliances became more common among large firms in 
the early 1980s. In separate analyses, we measured alliance 
activity over several different time periods, including longer 
periods (e.g., from 1970), as well as shorter periods (e.g., 
since 1990 or 1993), and the results for the hypothesized 
relationships were substantively unchanged from the results 
presented below. These two sets of measures serve as use- 
ful controls for unobserved heterogeneity that results from 
unobserved propensities by the actor to engage in those ac- 
tivities in the future (Heckman and Borjas, 1980). 
We also controlled for two other kinds of board ties that 
could influence CEO-board relationships and alliance forma- 
tion. First, we controlled for common board appointments 
(common appointments) held by the CEO and the outside 
director on other boards. A common tie exists if CEO A and 
an outside director B on the focal board both serve as out- 
side directors on another board. Social cohesion resulting 
from common membership as directors on another board 
could enhance the potential for trust and cooperation be- 
tween CEOs and directors on the focal board. Second, we 
controlled for the total number of appointments (total ap- 
pointments) held on other boards by the CEO and the out- 
side director. As discussed above, our measure of third-party 
ties effectively includes indirect ties with a distance of two 
links: if CEO A sits on another board with C, who sits on 
outside director B's board, A and B are separated by two 
links. When this measure is held constant, the control vari- 
able for total appointments captures the effect of indirect 
ties of greater length (i.e., three links or more). We con- 
trolled for such ties because they could amplify trust or dis- 
trust in the focal CEO-board relationship, although we would 
expect them to have a weaker effect than ties to third par- 
ties that are directly connected to both members of the 
CEO-board relationship. 
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Given that alliance formation could also be influenced by the 
content of sent interlock ties (i.e., relationships between top 
managers and manager-directors at the latter directors' 
home company boards, which are not included in measures 
of cooperation and control), we controlled for reciprocated 
appointments, coded as 1 if a top manager serves on the 
home company board of an outside director who is on the 
focal firm's board. 
Further, we controlled for several other possible exogenous 
influences on management-board relationships. Several au- 
thors have speculated that personal friendship ties between 
top managers and outside directors could influence profes- 
sional relationships on the board. Mace (1971), Finkelstein 
and Hambrick (1988), and others have suggested that friend- 
ship ties reduce the board's tendency to independently 
monitor management, although recent evidence suggests 
that such ties may enhance cooperation without reducing 
the level of monitoring activity (Westphal, 1999). There is 
also anecdotal evidence that friendship ties between top 
managers may facilitate the formation of strategic alliances 
(Alster, 1986). Thus, we included a survey measure of friend- 
ship ties, indicating the portion of the board composed of 
the CEO's personal friends. In separate analyses, described 
below, in which cooperation and control were measured for 
each CEO-director dyad, friendship ties were also measured 
at the dyad level. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correla- 
tions are provided in table 3. 
Analysis 
We used maximum-likelihood logit regression analysis to 
test the effect of interlock ties on the likelihood of alliance 
formation (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; Hosmer and Leme- 
show, 1989). Because the appropriate risk sets to test each 
of the hypotheses differ somewhat, we conducted a number 
of additional analyses to ensure consistency across our find- 
ings. Since hypothesis 1 examined the effect of interlock 
ties on alliance formation, the risk set for this analysis in- 
cluded all possible dyadic combinations between each of the 
focal firms in the final survey sample and all firms in the total 
sample frame (73,510 dyads). Since hypotheses 2-4 assume 
that an interlock tie exists, because board control or coopera- 
tion only occur when there is an interlock, the risk set nar- 
rows here from all possible dyads to only those dyads for 
which there was an interlock tie between the two firms. 
Thus, to test the effects of board control vs. cooperation on 
alliance formation, as well as the moderating effects of third- 
party ties, we conducted an initial set of analyses using logit 
regression on the sample of dyadic combinations between 
the focal firm and each of the home companies of CEO-di- 
rectors on the board (N = 898). Moreover, for the sample of 
possible dyadic combinations that included a responding out- 
side director, we also examined whether individual CEO- 
board-member relationships mattered by estimating separate 
models using each responding director's assessment of his 
or her individual relationship with the CEO (N = 412 dyads). 
In addition, we estimated Heckman selection models to en- 
sure that logit estimates were not biased by any unmea- 
sured differences between the smaller sample of CEO-direc- 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Analyses of Board Control and 
CEO-Board Cooperation* 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Alliance .15 .36 - 
2. Interlock tie .01 .11 .06 
3. Board control .00 .88 -.26 - 
4. CEO-board cooperation .00 .82 .31 - -.16 
5. Third-party ties 2.79 2.03 .12 .16 .05 .06 
6. Prior alliance activity, firm 1 5.98 5.57 .29 .05 .07 .09 .11 
7. Prior alliance activity, firm 2 6.35 5.94 .34 .07 .08 .09 .11 .02 
8. Prior alliance ties .09 .31 .23 .18 -.17 .21 .14 .17 
9. Constraint .00 1.33 .17 .17 .18 .13 -.02 .12 
10. Size 7.69 1.50 .02 -.05 -.04 -.08 .03 .06 
11. Performance .00 1.01 -.23 .05 -.08 -.04 -.01 -.13 
12. Solvency .38 .31 -.08 -.01 -.05 -.01 .01 .02 
13. R&D intensity .02 .02 -.18 .06 -.03 .00 .04 -.1 1 
14. Advertising intensity .02 .03 -.14 .02 .02 .06 .02 -.05 
15. Diversification .74 .56 -.05 .08 -.12 -.17 .00 -.04 
16. Industry overlap .09 .25 .22 .25 -.10 .20 .04 .03 
17. Common appointments 1.23 1.01 .09 .15 -.08 .07 .18 .04 
18. Total appointments 8.21 5.31 .07 .11 -.05 .02 .37 .01 
19. Reciprocated appointments .11 .31 .03 .29 -.09 .17 .03 .02 
20. Friendship ties .37 .34 .16 .02 -.18 .21 .04 .03 
* Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients are calculated for the sample of interlocked firms (N = 898), except 
statistics for interlock ties, which are calculated for the larger sample of all possible dyads (N = 73,510). 
tor dyads and dyads in the larger sample frame used for 
testing hypothesis 1. This approach uses the larger risk set 
to assess hypotheses 2-4 (i.e., N = 73,510). The Heckman 
model is essentially a two-stage procedure that estimates 
the likelihood of interlock ties with probit regression and 
then incorporates estimates of parameters from that model 
in a second-stage regression model to predict alliance forma- 
tion among dyads with an interlock tie; the second-stage 
model is also estimated with probit regression (van de Ven 
and van Praag, 1981). 
Formally, the Heckman model assumes that a potential ob- 
servation is observed if x1B1 + u1 > 0, where u1 has a stan- 
dard normal distribution. In addition, there is another regres- 
sion equation, y = x2B2 + uu2, where u2 also has a standard 
normal distribution but is potentially correlated with u1 with 
correlation p. In our case, the latter equation represents alli- 
ance formation while the former represents the likelihood of 
interlock ties between CEOs in a dyad. When p is signifi- 
cantly different from 0, standard regression techniques ap- 
plied to the second equation yield biased results, to the ex- 
tent that error terms in both equations contain some 
common omitted variables (van de Ven and van Praag, 
1981). For example, if firms that form interlock ties are more 
responsive to a given level of resource dependence or more 
sensitive to the need for trust between top managers in 
forming alliances than those firms not forming an interlock 
tie, then specification error would be present. Heckman's 
procedure generates consistent, asymptotically efficient esti- 
mates for such models, allowing us to generalize results to 
the larger sample frame (cf. Heckman, 1979). 
RESU LTS 
Table 4 provides the results of the logistic regression analy- 
sis of alliance formation, and table 5 gives the Heckman se- 
490/ASQ, September 1999 
 at University of Texas Libraries on March 6, 2015asq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Cooperative or Controlling? 
Table 3 (continued) 
Variable 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
8. Prior alliance ties .1 5 
9. Constraint .10 .14 
10. Size .03 .01 -.08 
11. Performance -.08 .03 -.04 -.06 
12. Solvency .05 .04 -.1 1 .36 .17 
13. R&D intensity -.10 -.12 .03 -.31 .14 .27 
14. Advertising intensity -.08 -.05 .01 -.09 .10 .05 -.18 
15. Diversification -.07 -.06 -.09 .26 -.03 -.12 .16 .15 
16. Industry overlap .03 .14 -.32 .18 -.03 -.06 .02 -.02 -.09 
17. Common appointments .03 .16 .05 .08 .01 .10 .07 .00 .13 .16 
18. Total appointments .03 -.01 -.04 .04 -.02 .00 .05 .45 .08 -.11 .45 
19. Reciprocated appointments -.01 .04 .19 .06 .05 .04 .06 -.01 .03 -.02 .01 .00 
20. Friendship ties -.02 .17 .10 -.04 .09 .06 .03 .10 .04 .01 .06 -.07 .05 
lection model results. The hypothesized effects are in bold. 
Model 1 in table 4 tests hypothesis 1, that an interlock tie 
between two firms will increase the likelihood of subsequent 
alliance formation between them. The results in model 1 do 
not support this hypothesis: after controlling for the extent 
of market constraint (i.e., resource interdependence) be- 
tween firms, as well as other financial and strategic factors, 
the existence of an interlock tie is not significantly related to 
subsequent alliance formation. 
Model 2 in table 4 tests hypotheses 2 and 3, which address 
the influence of management-board relationships on subse- 
quent alliance formation between the focal firm and outside 
directors' home companies. The results for board control and 
CEO-board cooperation shown in model 2 provide strong 
support for these hypotheses. Consistent with hypothesis 2, 
board control over the CEO is negatively related to the likeli- 
hood of forming an alliance between the focal firm and out- 
side directors' home companies. The results also support 
hypothesis 3: CEO-board cooperation is significantly and 
positively related to subsequent alliance formation. The hy- 
pothesized effects of board control and cooperation were 
also supported in Heckman selection models of alliance for- 
mation, as shown in model 1 of table 5. 
In summary, the first set of results indicates that the mere 
presence of a board interlock tie between firms does not 
predict the formation of strategic alliances between firms; 
instead, such ties may either increase or decrease the likeli- 
hood of alliance formation, depending on the nature of the 
CEO-director elationship that underlies the tie. The greater 
the extent to which an interlock tie results in cooperation 
between top managers of different firms in strategic deci- 
sion making (i.e., at the focal firm), the greater the likelihood 
of subsequent strategic cooperation between the focal firm 
and the outside director's home company. At the same time, 
the greater the extent to which an interlock tie results in an 
independent control relationship between top managers of 
different firms, the lower the likelihood of subsequent strate- 
gic cooperation between them. 
The next set of results tests hypothesis 4, that third-party 
ties resulting from appointments of focal-firm CEOs on other 
boards amplify the effects of independent board control and 
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Table 4 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Alliance Formation* 
Independent variable 1 2 3 
Interlock tie 0.44 
(.047) 
Board control -.391' -.589' 
(.149) (.203) 
CEO-board cooperation .575' .757' 
(.183) (.249) 
Third-party ties .006 .094 .098 
(.005) (.080) (.080) 
Third-party ties x board control -.199- 
(.074) 
Third-party ties x CEO-board .227' 
cooperation (.073) 
Prior alliance activity, firm 1 .002' .037' .037' 
(.0005) (.009) (.010) 
Prior alliance activity, firm 2 .003' .041' .040' 
(.0007) (.009) (.009) 
Prior alliance ties .057' 1.678' 1.701' 
(.018) (.552) (.555) 
Constraint .022' .289' .290' 
(.008) (.109) (.109) 
Size .002 .034 .045 
(.004) (.092) (.092) 
Performance -.013- -.292' -.288' 
(.005) (.132) (.132) 
Solvency -.032 -.463 -.491 
(.021) (.442) (.438) 
R&D intensity -.323- -9.490 -8.682 
(.161) (4.837) (4.850) 
Advertising intensity -.377' -10.389' -10.507 
(.159) (4.169) (4.176) 
Diversification -.013 -.177 -.195 
(.01 1) (.257) (.256) 
Industry overlap .047' 1.330' 1.356- 
(.017) (4.92) (4.95) 
Common appointments .010 .139 .168 
(.007) (.127) (.127) 
Total appointments .002 .053 .051 
(.002) (.036) (.036) 
Reciprocated appointments .011 .018 .008 
(.050) (.428) (.428) 
Friendship ties 2.839' 2.906' 
(1.022) (1.029) 
Constant .041 1.977 1.928 
(.045) (1.011) (1.017) 
N 73,510 898 898 
Chi square 104.18` 118.44' 140.36' 
*p < .01. 
* Standard errors are in parentheses. Hypothesized effects are in bold. 
CEO-board cooperation on alliance formation. The interaction 
effects in model 3 of table 4 support this hypothesis. Consis- 
tent with hypothesis 4a, the results show that as the num- 
ber of third-party ties between the CEO and outside direc- 
tors increases, the negative relationship between board 
control over the CEO and the likelihood of subsequent alli- 
ance formation between the focal firm and outside directors' 
home companies becomes stronger. The results also sup- 
port hypothesis 4b: as the number of third-party ties be- 
tween the CEO and outside directors increases, the positive 
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In these models, board control and CEO- 
board cooperation, which we assume to 
be group variables, are measured at the 
board level (Fama and Jensen, 1983); 
thus, effects on alliance formation should 
be similar across dyads on the same 
board. To check this assumption, we esti- 
mated separate models using measures 
of the individual participation of directors 
in control and cooperation activities (N = 
412). The results for these models were 
consistent with the results in tables 4 
and 5. 
Cooperative or Controlling? 
Table 5 
Heckman Selection Models of Alliance Formation (N= 73,510)* 
Independent variable 1 2 
Board control -.480- -.678- 
(.184) (.266) 
CEO-board cooperation .581- .767- 
(.201) (.270) 
Third-party ties .142 .139 
(.114) (.113) 
Third-party ties x board control -.259- 
(.097) 
Third-party ties x CEO-board cooperation .268- 
(.092) 
Prior alliance activity, firm 1 .034- .035- 
(.010) (.01 0) 
Prior alliance activity, firm 2 .037- .036- 
(.010) (.01 0) 
Prior alliance ties 1.627- 1 .594- 
(.564) (.567) 
Constraint .312- .31 1- 
(.116) (.116) 
Size .044 .041 
(.096) (.096) 
Performance -.342- -.333- 
(.138) (.138) 
Solvency -.419 -.424 
(.460) (.460) 
R&D intensity -10.756 -9.383 
(5.718) (5.760) 
Advertising intensity -1 1.085- -10.691- 
(4.881) (4.893) 
Diversification .156 .179 
(.267) (2.70) 
Industry. overlap 1.330- 1.346 
(.492) (.494) 
Common appointments .071 .089 
(.134) (.137) 
Total appointments .050 .052 
(.040) (.040) 
Reciprocated appointments .018 .01 1 
(.428) (.428) 
Friendship ties 2.799- 2.882- 
(1.101) (1.113) 
Constant 2.446 2.386 
(1.077) (1.081) 
Chi square 132.45- 151.220 
* p < .01. 
* Standard errors are in parentheses. Hypothesized effects are in bold. 
relationship between CEO-board cooperation and the likeli- 
hood of subsequent alliance formation between the focal 
firm and outside directors' home companies also becomes 
stronger. The hypothesized interaction effects were also 
supported in Heckman selection models of alliance forma- 
tion, as shown in model 2 of table 5.5 
Results for several of the control variables provide further 
insights. For instance, the degree to which firms are mutu- 
ally constrained by resource interdependence, as indicated 
by resource flows between their respective industries, is 
positively associated with subsequent alliance formation, 
consistent with the traditional resource dependence perspec- 
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tive on alliance formation. While this effect has previously 
only been observed at the interindustry level, our results 
demonstrate that such effects for resource dependence oc- 
cur at the dyad level as well. Results also show that friend- 
ship ties between CEOs and outside directors are positively 
and significantly related to subsequent alliance formation be- 
tween the focal firm and outside directors' home companies 
in each of the models. In contrast, common appointments to 
other boards are not significantly associated with alliance 
formation, nor are the main effects of third-party ties signifi- 
cant. In general, the various network variables do not have 
independent effects on alliance formation; instead, network 
effects are contingent on the content of CEO-director rela- 
tionships. 
We conducted several additional analyses to examine the 
robustness of our findings to alternative independent vari- 
ables and different samples. First, we conducted analyses of 
alliance formation using the archival measures of cooperation 
and control discussed above. As shown in table 6, the re- 
sults of these analyses are very similar to the results of 
analyses using the survey measures: model 1 shows that 
the archival measure of board control is significantly and 
negatively related to subsequent alliance formation, while 
the archival measure of cooperation has a significant and 
positive effect on alliance formation. Model 2 shows that 
these effects are amplified by third-party ties, as hypoth- 
esized. 
To further assess the robustness of our findings, we con- 
ducted separate logistic regression analyses with the full 
sample of dyads by estimating the interaction effects be- 
tween the presence of an interlock tie and board control or 
cooperation. Results are shown in table 7. As shown in 
model 2, there are significant interaction effects between an 
interlock tie and both cooperation and control. These results 
indicate that, while the mere presence of an interlock tie be- 
tween firms does not affect the likelihood of alliance forma- 
tion (as shown in model 1), the effect of an interlock tie be- 
comes significantly more positive as the level of CEO-board 
cooperation increases and significantly more negative as the 
level of control increases. These results again suggest that 
the effect of board interlock ties on alliance formation is con- 
tingent on the nature of the CEO-board relationship. We 
would not expect significant main effects for board control 
or cooperation, since these relationships should only in- 
crease or decrease the likelihood of alliance formation be- 
tween two specific firms provided an interlock tie exists be- 
tween them, which is not necessarily the case with this 
larger dataset. We also examined interaction effects using 
the individual, continuous-scale indicators of cooperation and 
control, to identify the level of cooperation and control at 
which interlock ties decreased the likelihood of alliance for- 
mation. The results of these analyses showed, for instance, 
that interlock ties have a negative effect on alliance forma- 
tion when a minority of directors have the same functional 
background as the CEO. In addition, the results showed that 
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Cooperative or Controlling? 
Table 6 
Supplementary Heckman Selection Models of Alliance Formation (N = 73,510)* 
With Archival Measures With Measures 
of Cooperation/Control of CEO-board Trust 
Independent variable 1 2 3 4 
Board control -.322 -.339- -.252 -.330 
(.120) (.123) (.185) (.266) 
CEO-board cooperation .603 .568- .311 .433 
(.230) (.233) (.203) (.268) 
CEO-board trust .605- .599- 
(.167) (.167) 
Third-party ties .139 .126 .141 .139 
(.113) (.113) (.114) (.114) 
Third-party ties x board control -.161' -.173 
(.073) (.097) 
Third-party ties x CEO-board cooperation .268- .119 
(.100) (.094) 
Prior alliance activity, firm 1 .034- .035- .035- .036- 
(.01 0) (.01 0) (.01 0) (.01 0) 
Prior alliance activity, firm 2 .036- .037- .037- .037- 
(.01 0) (.01 0) (.01 0) (.01 0) 
Prior alliance ties 1.566- 1.590' 1.589- 1.601' 
(.565) (.569) (.565) (.571) 
Constraint .310 .306- .309- .311 - 
(.116) (.115) (.116) (.117) 
Size .053 .047 .045 .049 
(.093) (.094) (.094) (.092) 
Performance -.290 -.332- -.339- -.330- 
(.137) (.138) (.137) (.139) 
Solvency -.427 - .431 -.436 -.434 
(.453) (.460) (.463) (.462) 
Research and development intensity -10.729 -9.384 -10.192 -9.150 
(5.724) (5.772) (5.745) (5.788) 
Advertising intensity -10.937- -10.625- -11.677- -11.392- 
(4.845) (4.875) (4.911) (4.909) 
Diversification .164 .186 .169 .185 
(.268) (.268) (.270) (.270) 
Industry overlap 1.333- 1.351 ' 1.358- 1.380- 
(.494) (.497) (.500) (.503) 
Common appointments .071 .093 .070 .091 
(.133) (.136) (.134) (.136) 
Total appointments .041 .051 .050 .051 
(.039) (.040) (.040) (.040) 
Reciprocated appointments .022 .019 .019 .019 
(.427) (.429) (.425) (.426) 
Friendship ties 2.804- 2.886- 2.810- 2.877- 
(1.103) (1.114) (1.103) (1.113) 
Board approval .124 .116 .118 .114 
(.208) (.208) (.208) (.209) 
Ingratiation .052 .053 .057 .062 
(.174) (.074) (.077) (.074) 
Constant 2.500 2.363 2.565 2.366 
(1.071) (1.077) (1.083) (1.094) 
Chi square 125.16- 139.38- 130.01' 148.150 
* p < .01. 
* Standard errors are in parentheses. Hypothesized effects are in bold. 
interlock ties decrease alliance formation when the CEO 
owns less than 1 percent of outstanding common stock. 
While our theoretical argument suggests that trust in the 
CEO-board relationship can explain how control and coopera- 
tion affect alliance formation, our primary analyses did not 
explicitly model the mediating effect of trust. Thus, one 
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Table 7 
Supplementary Logistic Regression Models of Alliance Formation (N = 
73,51 0)* 
Independent variable 1 2 
Interlock tie .043 .039 
(.047) (.046) 
Board control -.002 -.002 
(.004) (.004) 
CEO-board cooperation .002 .003 
(.008) (.008) 
Interlock tie x board control -.409- 
(.125) 
Interlock tie x CEO-board cooperation .331- 
(.1 1 1) 
Third-party ties .006 .005 
(.005) (.005) 
Prior alliance activity, firm 1 .002- .002- 
(.0005) (.0005) 
Prior alliance activity, firm 2 .003- .002- 
(.0007) (.0006) 
Prior alliance ties .057- .051' 
(.017) (.016) 
Constraint .02 1- .022- 
(.008) (.008) 
Size .002 .003 
(.004) (.004) 
Performance -.012- -.013- 
(.005) (.005) 
Solvency -.029 -.028 
(.021) (.021) 
R&D intensity -.320 -.307 
(.160) (.160) 
Advertising intensity -.371- -.364- 
(.158) (.156) 
Diversification -.013 -.014 
(.01 1) (.010) 
Industry overlap .045- .042- 
(.016) (.016) 
Common appointments .009 .008 
(.007) (.006) 
Total appointments .002 .002 
(.002) (.002) 
Reciprocated appointments .010 .010 
(.050) (.049) 
Constant .042 .033 
(.046) (.042) 
Chi square 102.97- 128.20- 
*p < .01. 
* Standard errors are in parentheses. Models are analyzed for the full sample 
using archival measures of board control and CEO-board cooperation. Hypoth- 
esized effects are in bold. 
might question whether other, related social processes me- 
diate these relationships. For instance, cooperation might be 
associated with political influence processes such as ingratia- 
tion, which could affect the likelihood of alliance formation 
between the focal firm and manager-directors' home compa- 
nies by enhancing directors' affect toward the CEO, without 
necessarily enhancing trust in the relationship. Similarly, co- 
operation could increase the board's approval of the CEO's 
performance and thus increase the likelihood of alliance for- 
mation independent of CEO-board trust. To assess the rela- 
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We measured trust in our survey as de- 
scribed in the method section above. 
Prior research has measured ingratiation 
as a unidimensional construct composed 
of multiple behaviors (Jones and Wort- 
man, 1973; Kipnis and Schmidt, 1988). 
Our ingratiation measure is based on Ku- 
mar and Beyerlein's (1991) scale, which 
taps key aspects of ingratiation such as 
flattery, favor-doing, opinion conformity, 
and impression management; while prior 
evidence for the reliability of this scale is 
mixed (e.g., Kacmar and Valle, 1997), the 
eight items used in the present study 
were adapted to the CEO-board context, 
and the scale showed acceptable inter- 
item reliability (alpha = .86) and interrater 
reliability (kappa = .81). Factor analysis 
clearly indicated that CEO advice and 
counsel did not load on the ingratiation 
factor (loadings were less than .2 for the 
cooperation items), suggesting that CEO- 
board cooperation is distinct from ingra- 
tiation (i.e., advice and counsel is not an 
aspect of ingratiation). Moreover, the re- 
sults presented in table 6 were un- 
changed when ingratiation was measured 
using any combination of the four behav- 
iors assessed with the scale (e.g., opin- 
ion conformity and flattery, favor-doing 
and flattery, etc.). Board approval was 
measured with two survey items that 
assessed the board's apparent overall 
satisfaction with the CEO's leadership. 
Cooperative or Controlling? 
tive importance of these different social processes in ex- 
plaining how control and cooperation affect alliance 
formation, we conducted further exploratory analyses using 
survey measures of trust, political influence (ingratiation), 
and board approval of the CEO.6 As shown in models 3 and 
4 of table 6, CEO-board trust has a strong and positive rela- 
tionship with alliance formation, while the effects of ingratia- 
tion and board approval are nonsignificant. In addition, when 
trust is added to the models, the effects of cooperation and 
control become nonsignificant, suggesting that CEO-board 
trust mediates the effects of cooperation and control on alli- 
ance formation (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Moreover, the ef- 
fects of ingratiation and board approval of the CEO are insig- 
nificant in all models. 
The results are not consistent with the view that preexisting 
trust in the CEO-board relationship led to cooperation, which 
then facilitated alliance formation through some other 
mechanism. The findings suggest that trust mediates the 
effects of cooperation/control, and not the reverse. We also 
measured trust using responses to the director survey, and 
results were substantively unchanged from results pre- 
sented in table 6. While researchers have typically viewed 
trust and distrust as one bipolar construct, Lewicki, McAllis- 
ter, and Bies (1998) recently suggested that distrust is a dis- 
tinct construct from trust. Thus, we conducted further analy- 
ses using only items that refer to distrust. Our results were 
nearly identical: distrust was strongly (and negatively) associ- 
ated with alliance formation, and the control and cooperation 
variables became nonsignificant when distrust was added to 
the models, suggesting that distrust mediates the effects of 
control and cooperation on alliance formation. Thus, even if 
trust and distrust are viewed as distinct concepts, the re- 
sults suggest that both predict alliance formation and medi- 
ate the effects of cooperation and control. Moreover, the 
CEO-board relationship appears to satisfy several of Lewicki, 
McAllister, and Bies' (1998) conditions for a high (negative) 
correlation between trust and distrust, including high value 
congruence and interdependence between the parties. 
DISCUSSION 
This study shows how board interlock ties can have qualita- 
tively different effects on the formation of joint ventures be- 
tween firms depending on the behavioral processes that un- 
derlie CEO-board relationships. The first set of results 
suggested that the mere presence of a board interlock tie 
between two firms does not appear to increase (or de- 
crease) the likelihood that they will enter into a strategic alli- 
ance with one another. Further results showed that these 
aggregate effects of board interlock ties appear to mask 
more specific effects that depend on the content of the tie. 
Specifically, the results suggest that there can be dark and 
bright sides to the presence of a board interlock tie between 
two firms depending on the underlying relationship. Higher 
levels of independent board control over management actu- 
ally decreased the likelihood of subsequent alliance forma- 
tion between them, while higher levels of CEO-board coop- 
eration in strategic decision making raised the likelihood that 
the two firms would enter into an alliance. These results 
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were confirmed with both survey-based and archival mea- 
sures of board cooperation and control, and they hold after 
controlling for a variety of economic and strategic variables 
that could influence alliance formation. Thus, the first set of 
results demonstrated how the consequences of board inter- 
lock ties for strategic cooperation depend critically on the 
behavioral content of the tie. 
Our theoretical framework goes beyond looking at the influ- 
ence of dyadic ties and their content to address whether the 
indirect ties in which parties to an interlock tie are embed- 
ded could influence interorganizational action. The findings 
are consistent with the perspective that third-party ties pri- 
marily amplify whatever relational dispositions already exist 
among directly connected actors-they not only appear to 
amplify trust resulting from cooperative interaction in CEO- 
board relationships, but they also amplify distrust resulting 
from independent board control. At the same time, such in- 
direct ties did not have significant main effects on alliance 
formation. Thus, the results appear to support the proposi- 
tion developed by Burt and Knez (1995) that third-party ties 
tend to reaffirm or amplify whichever predisposition manag- 
ers have toward their colleagues (see also Labianca, Brass, 
and Gray, 1998). 
Our finding that the effects of third-party connections are 
strongly contingent on the behavioral content of immediate, 
professional ties between top managers is not consistent 
with the view that such ties uniformly enhance trust be- 
tween individuals by increasing the reputational costs of non- 
cooperative behavior (Kreps, 1990; Raub and Weesie, 1990). 
Third-party ties are not effective in promoting cooperation 
when noncooperative behavior is normatively acceptable in 
the larger social structure, such that individuals do not incur 
reputational costs for noncooperative behavior. In our con- 
text, the reputation of an outside director is not necessarily 
damaged by noncooperative behavior (i.e., exercising inde- 
pendent control over CEOs). Instead, directors may even be 
increasingly rewarded for exercising independent control in 
the market for corporate directors; some evidence suggests 
that directors on controlling boards gain more subsequent 
appointments on other boards with relatively high levels of 
control over management, although they may also gain 
fewer appointments on cooperative boards (Zajac and West- 
phal, 1996). As a result, in the absence of reputational costs 
from noncooperation, third-party ties do not necessarily en- 
force such behavior. Future research conducted in other con- 
texts might examine explicitly whether the effects of third- 
party ties on trust between individuals are contingent on the 
normative status of cooperation vs. control in the larger so- 
cial structure. 
The results on trust offer additional support for our theoreti- 
cal argument by providing evidence that CEO-board coopera- 
tion and control influence alliance formation through their 
effects on CEO-board trust. That is, the results are consis- 
tent with the view that cooperation increases the likelihood 
of alliance formation by increasing trust between top manag- 
ers and manager-directors, while board control lowers the 
likelihood of alliance formation by reducing trust between 
them. Nevertheless, these additional analyses are merely 
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exploratory, and further research is clearly needed that uses 
alternative measures of trust and sociopolitical influence to 
verify more conclusively the social mechanism by which 
CEO-board interaction affects alliance formation. This could 
be further supplemented with studies that use alternative 
measures of cooperation and control. While this research is 
perhaps unique in demonstrating support for hypotheses 
about CEO-board relationships with both archival and survey 
measures of key constructs, there is a great need for re- 
search that uses alternative approaches to measuring coop- 
eration, control, and other forms of CEO-board interaction. 
The results for control variables included in our analysis also 
provide some valuable insights. Looking across the logit re- 
gression and Heckman selection model results, we found 
that previous ties between dyad members increase the likeli- 
hood of the firms entering an alliance. This is consistent with 
research highlighting the importance of the social network of 
prior alliances in influencing subsequent alliance formation 
(Kogut, Shan, and Walker, 1992; Gulati, 1995b, 1998; Powell, 
Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). 
Variables indicating prior alliance activity also capture any un- 
observed propensities of the firms to enter into alliances that 
are not captured by the independent variables and further 
attest to the robustness of our results (Heckman and Borjas, 
1980). We also found that some of our measures of re- 
source dependence were significant, indicating that resource 
dependence was indeed an important consideration for the 
creation of new alliances. Our measure for dyadic constraint 
was positive and significant as expected: the greater the 
constraint, the greater the likelihood of alliance formation. 
Moreover, the significant effect of friendship ties between 
CEOs and manager-directors provides further evidence that 
positive ties between CEOs and board members encourage 
alliance formation. 
In delineating the critical role of tie content in moderating 
network effects and then showing how it may be moderated 
further by third-party ties, this study makes several related 
contributions to research on interorganizational networks. 
First, as several authors have noted, very little empirical re- 
search has examined when network ties may lead to more 
negative relations between individuals or between organiza- 
tions (Brass and Burkhardt, 1992; Burt and Knez, 1995; Labi- 
anca, Brass, and Gray, 1998; Westphal and Zajac, 1997). By 
exploring how the content of network ties might diminish 
mutual trust between individuals, thus impeding alliance for- 
mation, this study investigates what Burt and Knez (1995: 
261) called the "dark side" of social networks. This is further 
developed by showing that both negative and positive ties 
between dyads of firms are amplified by third-party connec- 
tions in which firms are embedded. This of course assumes 
that alliances are a beneficial strategy that are somehow pre- 
empted by negative connections between firms. 
Second, research on social networks has typically treated 
network ties as exogenous; relatively little empirical research 
has examined the origin of organizational networks (Gulati, 
1998; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). It is important to recognize 
that both interlocks (our key independent variable) and joint 
ventures (our dependent variable) are interorganizational rela- 
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tionships that accumulate into a social network. This study 
considers how the creation of interorganizational networks of 
strategic alliances may be influenced in significant ways by 
the social networks of board interlocks in which firms are 
placed. As a result, this study examines the multiplexity of 
ties in which firms are embedded and the relationship be- 
tween those ties: new social networks result from a social 
process in which preexisting ties may shape their creation. 
This is also distinctive because these two networks exist at 
different levels of analysis: the relationships between corpo- 
rate leaders that make up board interlocks are individual level 
ties, while strategic alliances occur across firms. Very little 
empirical research has considered how social ties between 
individuals can influence a different kind of network tie at 
the interorganization level (for exceptions, see Galaskiewicz, 
1985b; Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1997). Thus, the find- 
ings have implications for cross-level perspectives on the 
formation of interorganizational networks by showing how 
the micro-content of network ties between individual leaders 
can play an important role in the development of organiza- 
tion-level ties. 
The findings of this study may also have important implica- 
tions for the corporate governance literature, as well as the 
literature on interorganizational cooperation. Surprisingly little 
empirical research has considered how boards of directors 
may influence strategic cooperation between firms. In the 
corporate governance literature, resource dependence theo- 
rists have viewed interlocking directorates and joint ventures 
as two independent and alternative mechanisms for resolv- 
ing environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Moreover, research on CEO-board relationships has also not 
considered how such ties may influence cooperative strate- 
gies. This literature has tended to examine how CEO-board 
relationships characterized by board independence from 
management affect competitive strategy, such as diversifica- 
tion strategy, and the propensity for boards to discipline 
managers for poor performance that affects shareholders 
(Walsh and Seward, 1990; Gibbs, 1993; Hoskisson, Johnson, 
and Moesel, 1994). The findings of this study suggest that 
an unintended side effect of CEO-board relationships charac- 
terized by independent board control is to reduce the likeli- 
hood that firms will identify and pursue strategic alliance op- 
portunities with certain other companies (i.e., the home 
companies of outside directors on the board). The findings 
are consistent with recent evidence that independent board 
control tends to politicize the CEO-board relationship, 
prompting CEOs to devote more time and attention to build- 
ing political support among directors rather than identifying 
new strategic opportunities (Westphal, 1998). 
Research on alliances has primarily considered their forma- 
tion as resulting from critical resource contingencies and has 
only recently paid attention to some of the social structural 
elements that may influence their formation (Gulati, 1998). 
Yet there is a growing stream of research in economic soci- 
ology that suggests that organizational actions are strongly 
influenced by the social ties in which organizations are em- 
bedded (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). This study 
builds on the embeddedness perspective and specifies 
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some of the ties that may influence the alliance behavior of 
firms. It shows how organizational decisions, such as entry 
into joint ventures, can be influenced in important ways by 
the social networks of board interlocks in which organiza- 
tional decision makers are placed. Moreover, it demonstrates 
that there may be a dark side to embeddedness that can 
influence the alliance decisions of firms. 
The findings of this study suggest avenues for future re- 
search. One might examine, for instance, whether prior co- 
operative or controlling relationships between top managers 
on boards might affect not only the likelihood of forming 
strategic alliances with specific other firms but also the sub- 
sequent success of those strategies (Gulati and Lawrence, 
1999). In an insightful study, Baker (1984) suggested that 
distinct social structural patterns in the stock options market 
can alter the direction and magnitude of option price volatil- 
ity. Similarly, in this instance, the social structure of board 
interlocks in which alliances are created can influence the 
relative terms of trade of the agreement and also dampen 
the volatility that usually occurs in such partnerships. On one 
hand, good rapport between top managers resulting from 
prior involvement in cooperative relationships on other 
boards may lead to more successful alliances by facilitating 
efforts to flexibly adjust the roles and responsibilities of alli- 
ance partners as environmental conditions change over time 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1 992; Doz, 1996). On the other hand, 
in-group biases resulting from CEO-board cooperation may 
lead to excessive levels of trust between top managers, so 
that each party becomes overly optimistic about the capabili- 
ties and likely contributions of the other. Thus, empirical 
research is clearly needed to determine how initial relation- 
ships between corporate leaders moderate the conse- 
quences of alliance formation. 
Another area for future research would be to explore more 
thoroughly the full array of economic and organizational im- 
peratives that might motivate two firms to enter into a joint 
venture. There has been considerable work on this question, 
much of which has been incorporated in the control variables 
included here, but there is still room to explore these issues 
further. One such example is our measure of industry over- 
lap, which assesses the extent to which two firms in a dyad 
operate in overlapping industries and captures the resultant 
opportunities for collaboration that may occur for two firms. 
This measure implicitly treats all industries as equivalent and 
does not take into account the characteristics of the indus- 
tries in which the overlap occurs. It would be useful to con- 
sider industry heterogeneity on important dimensions such 
as concentration ratio and geographical dispersion of capabili- 
ties that could result in greater or fewer alliances. Along the 
same lines, it would also be fruitful to consider the role of 
other possible determinants of alliance formation, some of 
which may even be associated with board cooperation and 
control. Our comprehensive efforts to include a variety of 
economic and strategic variables that have been considered 
to predict alliance formation, while also using the Heckman 
selection model to control for the effects of sample selec- 
tion bias, is a first step in this direction. 
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This study confirms that board interlocks can be influential 
for the creation of new strategic alliances between firms. 
This effect is strongly conditioned, however, by the behav- 
ioral processes that underlie the connection between firms, 
and these cohesion effects are moderated, in turn, by the 
third-party ties in which they are situated. Thus, the findings 
show how the creation of alliances between firms is shaped 
by the social context in which they are embedded, contribut- 
ing to a richer, socially informed account of organizational 
action. 
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